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Abstract—In this paper, we consider a homogenous multi-
antenna downlink network where a passive eavesdropper intends
to intercept the communication between a base station (BS)
and multiple secure users (SU) over Rayleigh fading channels.
In order to guarantee the security of information transfer,
physical layer security is employed accordingly. For such a
multiple user (MU) secure network, the number of accessing SUs,
namely transmission mode, has a great impact on the secrecy
performance. Specifically, on the one hand, a large number of
accessing SUs will arise high inter-user interference at SUs,
resulting in a reduction of the capacity of the legitimate channel.
On the other hand, high inter-user interference will interfere
with the eavesdropper and thus degrades the performance of the
eavesdropper channel. Generally speaking, the harmful inter-
user interference may be transformed as a useful tool of anti-
eavesdropping. The focus of this paper is on selecting the optimal
transmission mode according to channel conditions and system
parameters, so as to maximize the sum secrecy outage capacity.
Moreover, through asymptotic analysis, we present several simple
mode selection schemes in some extreme cases. Finally, simulation
results validate the effectiveness of the proposed mode selection
schemes in MU secure communications.
Index Terms—Physical layer security, secrecy outage capacity,
mode selection, asymptotic analysis.
I. INTRODUCTION
Information security is always a critical issue of wireless
communications due to the open nature of wireless channels.
Traditionally, information security is realized by using com-
plex cryptography technology. In fact, information theory has
proven that secure communication can be guaranteed by only
exploiting the characteristics of wireless channels, e.g., fading,
noise and interference, namely physical layer security [1] [2].
The essential of physical layer security is to maximize the
secrecy rate, which is defined as the rate difference between
the legitimate channel and the eavesdropper channel [3] [4].
If there are multiple antennas at the information source, by
exploiting spatial degrees of freedom, the legitimate channel
rate is increased and the eavesdropper channel rate is decreased
simultaneously, so the secrecy rate can be improved signif-
icantly. Thus, physical layer security coupling with multi-
antenna techniques has received considerably research inter-
ests [5]-[8].
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A. Related Works
Intuitively, in multi-antenna secure networks, by transmit-
ting the information in the null space of the eavesdropper
channel, the eavesdropper can not intercept any useful infor-
mation. However, in the sensing of maximizing the secrecy
rate, this approach seems not to be optimal. The key is to select
a transmit direction, namely beamforming, so as to achieve an
optimal tradeoff between maximizing the legitimate channel
capacity and minimizing the eavesdropper channel capacity
[9]-[11]. In [12], the problem of optimal transmit beamforming
in a MISO system was addressed by maximizing the secrecy
rate. A potential drawback of the above approach lies in that
the source must have full channel state information (CSI)
to design the transmit beam. To alleviate the assumption, a
joint power allocation and beamforming scheme was proposed
based on full CSI of the legitimate channel and partial CSI of
the eavesdropper channel [13]. Yet, it is difficult to obtain the
CSI for the source, especially the CSI of the eavesdropper
channel, because the passive eavesdropper will hide itself as
good as possible. It is proved that if there is no CSI of the
eavesdropper channel, the beamforming alone the direction of
the legitimate channel is optimal [18]. Since the secrecy rate
is jointly determined by the legitimate and the eavesdropper
channel capacities, if the source has no CSI of the eavesdrop-
per channel, it is impossible to maintain a steady secrecy rate
over all realizations of fading channels. In this context, the
secrecy outage capacity is adopted as a useful and intuitive
metric to evaluate security, which is defined as the achievable
maximum secrecy rate under the condition that the outage
probability that the real transmission rate surpasses the secrecy
rate is equal to a given value [14]. The secrecy outage capacity
based on antenna selection is analyzed in an uncorrelated
MIMO system [15] and in a correlated MIMO system [16].
Note that the assumption of full CSI for the legitimate channel
at the source also seems impractical in multi-antenna systems,
especially in frequency division duplex (FDD) systems. To
solve this problem, limited feedback techniques are introduced
into multi-antenna secure systems to convey the quantized CSI
from the legitimate receiver to the source [17] [18].
Another advantage of the MIMO system lies in that it can
support multiple users transmission, namely space division
multiple access, so the performance is improved significantly
[19]-[22]. In [23], the secrecy rate over MU-MIMO broadcast-
ing channels was well studied. In [24], a robust beamforming
scheme for MU-MIMO downlink networks was proposed by
using a Bayesian approach. In MU-MIMO systems, inter-
user interference is a pivotal factor affecting the overall
performance. For a given precoding scheme, a large number of
accessing users is beneficial to exploit the spatial multiplexing
gain, but also arises high inter-user interference at users.
Thus, it is better to select the number of accessing users,
namely transmission mode, according to channel conditions
and system parameters [25] [26]. Interestingly, in MU secure
communications, the harmful inter-user interference can be
used to interfere with the interception of the eavesdropper.
Generally speaking, inter-user interference has two completely
opposite functions. A detailed investigation of the impact of
multiuser interference on the secrecy performance was carried
out in [27], and thus multiuser scheduling was called for
secrecy performance enhancement. A single user selection
scheduling was proposed in [28], so the inter-user interference
can be avoided completely. On the contrary, the users that the
multi-antenna system can support at best was scheduled in
[29], so as to improve the sum rate of the legitimate channel.
In fact, the number of scheduled users should be carefully
selected according to channel conditions. Therefore, it makes
sense to perform mode selection in MU-MIMO downlink
networks from a perspective of optimizing the performance.
B. Main Contributions
In this paper, we consider a MU-MIMO downlink network
in presence of a passive eavesdropper. Considering the large
CSI feedback amount for multiple legitimate channels, oppor-
tunistic space division multiple access (OSDMA) [30] [31] is
adopted to exploit the MU gain due to its low complexity,
small overhead and good performance. The focus of this
paper is on mode selection to optimize the utility of inter-user
interference in MU secure communications based on physical
layer security. The major contributions of this paper can be
summarized as follows:
1) We present a framework of physical layer security
in MU-MIMO downlink networks with limited CSI
feedback based on OSDMA, and propose to transform
the harmful inter-user interference to enhance wireless
security through user scheduling.
2) It is found that under different channel conditions, inter-
user interference plays different roles. We derive an
explicit expression for secrecy outage capacity in terms
of transmission mode, transmit power, user number,
and channel condition. By maximizing the sum secrecy
outage capacity, we obtain an adaptive mode selection
scheme.
3) Through asymptotic analysis, we provide some guide-
lines for simple mode selection as follows:
a) At low SNR regime, maximum available mode
should be adopted. Relaxing the requirement on
the outage probability and increasing the number
of SUs are hardly helpful to improve the secrecy
performance.
b) At high SNR regime, single SU mode is the best
choice and multiple-SU mode will result in zero
rate.
c) If the number of SUs is sufficiently large, max-
imum available mode can asymptotically achieve
the optimal secrecy performance.
C. Paper Organization
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section
II gives a brief introduction of the considered MU-MIMO
downlink network employing physical layer security. Section
III focuses on the analysis and the design of the mode
selection scheme based on the criterion of maximizing the
sum secrecy outage capacity. Through asymptotic performance
analysis, we present several simple mode selection schemes in
some extreme cases in Section IV. Section V presents several
simulation results to validate the effectiveness of the proposed
schemes, and finally Section VI concludes the whole paper.
Notations: We use bold upper (lower) letters to denote
matrices (column vectors), (·)H to denote conjugate transpose,
E[·] to denote expectation, ‖ · ‖ to denote the L2 norm of
a vector, | · | to denote the absolute value, (a)+ to denote
max(a, 0), ⌈a⌉ to denote the smallest integer not less than
a, ⌊a⌋ to denote the largest integer not greater than a, and
d
= to denote the equality in distribution. The acronym i.i.d.
means “independent and identically distributed”, pdf means
“probability density function” and cdf means “cumulative
distribution function”.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
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Fig. 1. A model of the MU-MIMO downlink network with physical layer
security.
We consider a MU-MIMO downlink network, where a base
station (BS) with Nt antennas communicates with K single an-
tenna secure users (SU), while a single antenna eavesdropper
also receives the message sent from the BS and tries to detect
it. We use hk to denote the kth legitimate channel from the BS
to the kth SU, whose elements are i.i.d. zero mean and unit
variance complex Gaussian random variables (homogeneous
network in terms of users’s average channels as in [29]).
Similarly, we use αg to denote the eavesdropper channel from
the BS to the eavesdropper, where α is the relative path
loss and g denotes the small-scale fading vector with i.i.d.
zero mean and unit variance complex Gaussian distributed
entries. We assume that the BS has partial instantaneous CSI
about the legitimated channel through limited feedback and
only statistical CSI about the eavesdropper channel, since the
eavesdropper is passive.
The network is operated in the form of time slots. It is
assumed that the channels remain constant during a time
slot, and independently fade slot by slot. At the beginning of
each time slot, the BS randomly generates M Nt-dimensional
normalized orthogonal vectors wm,m = 1, · · · ,M , where
M with the constraint of 1 ≤ M ≤ Nt is the so-called
transmission mode. For example, select M vectors out of the
Nt singular vectors of a Nt ×Nt complex Gaussian random
matrix. The selection of M , namely mode selection, is the
focus of this paper, and we will discuss it later in detail. Then,
the BS broadcasts a precoded training vector x =
M∑
m=1
wmsi to
the SUs, where si is the normalized training symbol known by
the SUs in advance. It is assumed that each user has perfect
CSI related to its corresponding legitimate channel through
channel estimation and the information feedback is error-free.
Then, the k-th SU computes its received signal-to-interference-
plus-noise ratio (SINR) over the m-th beam as
γk,m =
P |hkwm|2
M∑
i=1,i6=m
P |hkwi|2 + σ2
, (1)
where P is the transmit power on each beam and σ2 is the
noise variance. By comparing its M SINRs over M beams,
the k-th SU finds the optimal beam according to the following
criterion:
wmk = arg max
1≤m≤M
γk,m. (2)
Then, the k-th SU conveys the index mk and the corre-
sponding SINR γk,mk to the BS. After receiving the feedback
information from the K SUs, the BS selects an optimal SU
with the largest SINR for each beam. Thereafter, the BS
communicates with the selected M SUs in the rest of this
time slot. It is worth pointing out the probability of a SU
being selected by multiple beams if the number of SU is large,
so we neglect it in this paper. For convenience, we use hm
to denote the SU’s channel vector over the m-th beam wm,
then the corresponding legitimate channel capacity and the
eavesdropper channel capacity are given by
Cl,m = log2(1 + λm), (3)
and
Ce,m = log2(1 + ηm), (4)
respectively, where λm = |hmwm|
2
M∑
i=1,i6=m
|hmwi|2+σ2/P
and ηm =
|gwm|2
M∑
i=1,i6=m
|gwi|2+σ2/α2P
. Thus, the secrecy rate on the m-th beam
can be expressed as [29]
Csec,m = (Cl,m − Ce,m)
+
. (5)
Since the BS have no knowledge of the eavesdropper
channel g, it is impossible to maintain a steady secrecy rate
over all realizations of the fading channel. In this case, the
BS can only transmit the signal with a fixed rate. Thus,
there inevitably exists the case that the transmission rate is
greater than the secrecy rate. Then, the information may be
intercepted by the eavesdropper. In order to guarantee the
security of information transmission, the probability that the
transmission rate surpasses the secrecy rate, namely the outage
probability, must be controlled within a bearable range. In
previous literatures, the achievable maximum secrecy rate
fulfilling a given requirement on the outage probability ε is
called as secrecy outage capacity Rm(ε). Mathematically, it
is given by
Pr(Rm(ε) > Csec,m) = ε. (6)
In this paper, we take the sum secrecy outage capacity as
the performance metric. As the name implies, sum secrecy
outage capacity denotes the sum of all scheduled SUs’ se-
crecy outage capacity. Note that given a requirement on the
outage probability ε, an important factor affecting the sum
secrecy outage capacity is the number of accessing users M ,
namely transmission mode. A large M means higher inter-user
interference, resulting in a decrease of both the legitimate and
the eavesdropper channel capacities. Therefore, there exists an
optimal M maximizing the sum secrecy outage capacity. In
what follows, we focus on the optimal mode selection for such
a MU-MIMO downlink network, so as to maximize the sum
secrecy outage capacity.
III. OPTIMAL MODE SELECTION
In this section, we concentrate on dynamic mode selection
in a MU-MIMO downlink network according to channel
conditions and security requirements, so as to maximize the
sum secrecy outage capacity. Prior to discussing the mode
selection, we first give a quantitative analysis of the secrecy
outage capacity to reveal the effect of transmission mode.
From (6), the outage probability on the m-th beam can be
calculated as
ε = Pr
(
Rm(ε) > log2
(
1 + λm
1 + ηm
))
= Pr
(
λm < (1 + ηm)2
Rm(ε) − 1
)
=
∫ ∞
0
∫ (1+ηm)2Rm(ε)−1
0
fλm(x)fηm (y)dxdy
=
∫ ∞
0
Fλm
(
(1 + y)2Rm(ε) − 1
)
fηm(y)dy, (7)
where fλm(x) and Fλm(x) are the probability density function
(pdf) and cumulative distribution function (cdf) of λm, respec-
tively, and fηm(y) is the pdf of ηm. Clearly, in order to derive
the outage probability, the key is to obtain the distributions
of λm and ηm. In the following, we turn our attention to the
analysis of the two distributions.
According to the definition of λm, it can be considered as
the maximum SINR on the m-th beam through choosing the
optimal channel hm out of K ones. For an arbitrary channel
vector hn with i.i.d. zero mean and unit variance complex
Gaussian distributed entries, |hnwm|2 is χ2(2) distributed
[32], and thus
M∑
i=1,i6=m
|hnwi|2 is χ2(2M − 2) distributed.
Therefore, for a random variable ξ = |hnwm|
2
M∑
i=1,i6=m
|hnwi|2+σ2/P
,
its cdf Fξ(x) can be derived as
Fξ(x) =
∫ ∞
0
∫ x(y+σ2/P )
0
exp(−y)yM−2
Γ(M − 1)
exp(−z)dzdy
= 1−
exp(−x/ρ)
(1 + x)M−1
, (8)
where ρ = P/σ2 is the transmit SNR. Since λm is the maxi-
mum value from K independent random variables distributed
as ξ, we have
Fλm(x) = (Fξ(x))
K
=
(
1−
exp(−x/ρ)
(1 + x)M−1
)K
. (9)
For ηm, since the selection of wm is independent of the
eavesdropper channel g, so it has the cdf similar to ξ, and
thus its pdf can be expressed as
fηm(y) =
∂
(
1− exp(−y/α
2ρ)
(1+y)M−1
)
∂y
=
(M − 1) exp(−y/α2ρ)
(1 + y)M
+
exp(−y/α2ρ)
α2ρ(1 + y)M−1
.(10)
Substituting (9) and (10) into (7), the outage probability is
transformed as (11) at the top of next page, where a(n) =
exp(−n(2Rm(ε)−1)/ρ)
2n(M−1)Rm(ε)
, µ(n) = (n2Rm(ε) + 1/α2)/ρ, ν(n) =
n(M − 1) +M and υ(n) = (n+ 1)(M − 1). (11) is derived
according to [27, Eqn. 3.3532]. W (x,N) with N being a
natural number, is defined as
W (x,N) =


1/x if N = 0
− exp(x)Ei(−x) if N = 1,
1
Γ(N)
N−1∑
n=1
Γ(n)(−x)N−1−n
− (−x)
N−1
Γ(N) exp(x)Ei(−x) if N ≥ 2
where Ei(x) =
∫ x
−∞
exp(t)
t dt is the exponential integral
function. Since ε is a monotonously increasing function of
Rm(ε), for a given ε, it is able to find the associated Rm(ε)
with a certain transmission mode M according to (11). For
convenience, we use G(Rm(ε)) to represent (11), and thus
G−1(ε) is equivalent to Rm(ε), where G−1(x) indicates the
inversive function of G(x). From (11), we can also derive the
interception probability that the secrecy rate is less than zero
by letting Rm(ε) = 0. Mathematically, it can be expressed as
(12) at the top of next page.
For such a homogeneous network, if the SUs have a
common requirement on the outage probability ε, the sum
secrecy outage capacity with transmission mode M is given
by
R = MG−1(ε). (13)
In this paper, we intend to select an optimal transmission
mode M⋆, so as to maximize the sum secrecy outage capacity.
However, due to the complexity of (11), it is difficult to present
an explicit expression for M⋆. As we know, given the number
of BS antennas Nt, the transmission mode M belongs to
[1, Nt]. In practical systems, the number of BS antennas is
quite limited, i.e., Nt = 4 in LTE systems and Nt = 8
in LTE-A systems. Thus, we could first derive the secrecy
outage capacity for each mode, then determine the optimal
mode with the maximum sum secrecy outage capacity. The
whole procedure can be summarized as below.
Input: Nt, P , σ2, α2, K , and ε. m = 1 and ∆R is a
small positive real value.
Output: M⋆
while m ≤ Nt do
Rm = 0;
while G(Rm) < ε do
Rm = Rm +∆R;
end
m = m+ 1;
end
M⋆ = arg max
1≤m≤Nt
(mRm).
Algorithm 1: Mode Selection Algorithm
Remark: Through mode selection, we find the optimal trade-
off among spatial multiplexing gain, inter-user interference
and anti-eavesdropping, so the sum secrecy outage capacity
is maximized. As a simple example, if the SNR is sufficiently
high, multiuser transmission may lead to performance satura-
tion due to inter-user interference, so the secrecy performance
is impossible to be improved by increasing the SNR. In this
context, single user transmission, namely M = 1, may be
optimal in the sense of maximizing the sum secrecy outage
capacity. Moreover, it is worth pointing out that Algorithm
1 can be extended to a general case with an arbitrary detec-
tion technique. Specifically, for a certain detection technique,
such as successive interference cancellation, we can derive
the corresponding sum secrecy outage capacity or the other
secrecy performance metrics, which is always a function of
the transmission mode. Similarly, by optimizing the secrecy
performance, it is possible to obtain the optimal transmission
mode.
IV. ASYMPTOTIC ANALYSIS
In order to reduce the complexity of mode selection, we
perform asymptotical analysis in some extreme cases, such
as noise-limited case, interference-limited case and large SU
number case. In what follows, we investigate the three cases,
respectively.
A. Noise-Limited Case
If transmit power P is quite small or the noise variance σ2
is large enough, the interference terms of λm and ηm can be
ε =
∫ ∞
0
(
1−
exp(−(2Rm(ε) − 1)/ρ) exp(−(2Rm(ε)/ρ)y)
2(M−1)Rm(ε)(1 + y)M−1
)K
(M − 1) exp(−y/α2ρ)
(1 + y)M
dy
+
∫ ∞
0
(
1−
exp(−(2Rm(ε) − 1)/ρ) exp(−(2Rm(ε)/ρ)y)
2(M−1)Rm(ε)(1 + y)M−1
)K
exp(−y/α2ρ)
α2ρ(1 + y)M−1
dy
= 1 +
∫ ∞
0
K∑
n=1
(
K
n
)
(−1)n(M − 1)a(n)
exp
(
−
((
n2Rm(ε) + 1/α2
)
/ρ
)
y
)
(1 + y)n(M−1)+M
dy
+
∫ ∞
0
K∑
n=1
(
K
n
)
(−1)n
a(n)
α2ρ
exp
(
−
((
n2Rm(ε) + 1/α2
)
/ρ
)
y
)
(1 + y)(n+1)(M−1)
dy
= 1 +
K∑
n=1
(
K
n
)
(−1)n
(
(M − 1)a(n)W (µ(n), ν(n)) +
a(n)
α2ρ
W (µ(n), υ(n))
)
. (11)
Pr(Csec,m < 0) = G(0)
= 1−
K∑
n=1
(
K
n
)
(−1)n
(
(M − 1)W
(
(n+ 1/α2)/ρ, ν(n)
) 1
α2ρ
W ((n+ 1/α2)/ρ, υ(n))
)
. (12)
negligible with respect to the noise term, namely the noise-
limited case. In this case, we obtain a simple mode selection
scheme as follows:
Theorem 1: For the noise-limited case, full spatial multiplex-
ing, namely M⋆ = Nt, can obtain the maximum sum secrecy
outage capacity.
Proof: Please refer to Appendix I.
Remark: From the Theorem 1, it is known that at extreme
low SNR regime, the sum secrecy outage capacity with
different numbers of SUs and/or different requirements on
the outage probabilities asymptotically approaches zero as the
SNR decreases. This is because as the SNR tends to zero,
both the legitimate and eavesdropper channel rates approaches
to zero, then the secrecy rate becomes zero regardless of the
number of SUs and the requirement on the outage probability.
Moreover, the interception probability that the secrecy rate
is less than zero in such a case can be expressed as (14).
As K approaches infinity, the interception probability in (14)
approaches zero, so the probability of nonzero secrecy rate is
nearly equal to 1. Then, as long as K is large enough, there
is nonzero secrecy rate with probability 1.
B. Interference-Limited Case
If the transmit power P is quite large or the noise variance
σ2 is sufficiently small, the noise term is negligible with
respect to the interference term in the received SINRs λm
and ηm, namely the interference-limited case. In this case, we
also have a simple mode selection scheme as follows:
Theorem 2: For the interference-limited case, single SU
transmission mode, namely M⋆ = 1, can obtain the maximum
sum secrecy outage capacity.
Proof: Please refer to Appendix II.
Remark: From the Theorem 2, it is known that at extreme
high SNR regime, the sum secrecy outage capacity with M >
1 asymptotically approaches zero as the SNR increases. This
is because at high SNR, both the legitimate and eavesdropper
channel rates with M > 1 have the same performance ceiling
due to interference limitation. In this context, the sum secrecy
outage capacity tends to zero.
In such a case, the interception probability is given by
Pr(Csec,m < 0) =
1
K + 1
. (15)
More interestingly, it is found that the interception probability
Pr(Csec,m < 0) is independent of the channel condition, and
is a monotonously decrease function of K . Then, it is possible
to enhance wireless security by adding the SUs.
C. Large SU number case
When the number of SU K is large enough, one can always
find M SUs with orthogonal channels, such that the inter-user
interference is canceled. In this case, we present a simple mode
selection scheme as follows:
Theorem 3: For the large SU number case, M⋆ = Nt can
obtain the maximum sum secrecy outage capacity.
Proof: Please refer to Appendix III.
This large K case cancels the interference completely,
which is equivalent to the noise-limited case, so they have
the same optimal transmission mode. Furthermore, the inter-
ception probability in this case can be derived as
Pr(Csec,m < 0) = 2
−(Nt−1) log2(1+ρ ln(KNt))
× exp
(
−
2log2(1+ρ ln(KNt)) − 1
α2ρ
)
.(16)
The interception probability decreases as K and Nt increase
and α2 decreases.
Pr(Csec,m < 0) =
exp
(
1+1/α2
ρ
)(
1−
(
1− exp(−(1 + 1/α2)/ρ)
)K+1)
K + 1
. (14)
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
To evaluate the performance of the proposed transmission
mode selection scheme for a MU-MIMO downlink network
employing with physical layer security, we present several
simulation results in different scenarios. For convenience, we
set Nt = 4, α2 = 0.01, K = 10, ε = 0.05 and ∆R = 0.01
for all simulation scenarios without explicit explanation. In
the following, we use AMS to denote the proposed adaptive
mode selection scheme, and use FTM1 and FTM2 to denote
the traditional fixed transmission mode schemes with M = 1
and M = Nt, respectively. In addition, we use TSNR in dB
to represent the transmit SNR 10 log10 Pσ2 . Without loss of
generality, we take the sum secrecy outage capacity as the
performance metric.
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Fig. 2. Theoretical and simulation performance comparison with different
path losses.
First, we check the accuracy of the derived theoretical
results with different path losses. As shown in Fig.2, the the-
oretical results are well coincided with the simulation results
in the whole TSNR region. It is found that at low TSNR,
the sum secrecy outage capacities with different path losses
are nearly the same. This is because the sum secrecy outage
capacity asymptotically tends to zero under this condition.
However, as TSNR increases, the sum secrecy outage capacity
with α = 0.01 is obviously better than that with α = 0.10,
since the interception capability of the eavesdropper becomes
weak. So far, short-distance interception is still an open issue
for physical layer security.
Then, we compare the sum secrecy outage capacities of
AMS, FTM1 and FTM2 schemes. As seen in Tab.I at the top
of next page, at low SNR regime, the proposed AMS scheme
chooses high order transmission mode, since the inter-user in-
terference is quite small with respect to the noise in legitimate
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Fig. 3. Performance comparison of different mode selection schemes.
TABLE II
TRANSMISSION MODES FOR AMS WITH DIFFERENT OUTAGE
PROBABILITIES.
P
P
P
P
PP
ε
TSNR
-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10
0.10 4 4 4 4 3 3 2 2 2 2 1
0.05 4 4 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 1 1
0.01 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
channel, and a large M can exploit the spatial multiplexing
gain and counteract the interception, so as to improve the sum
secrecy outage capacity. For example, as seen in Fig.3, there
is about 0.2 b/s/Hz performance gain over FTM1 with SNR
= −2 dB. When SNR is greater than a threshold, such as 8dB,
the proposed AMS scheme would adopt single SU transmis-
sion mode, this is because it is interference-limited under this
condition, which is consistent with our theoretical claim in
Theorem 2. Additionally, at high SNR, the sum secrecy outage
capacity of FTM2 asymptotically approaches zero as claimed
in Proposition 2. Thus, the proposed AMS scheme can achieve
the optimal performance at the whole SNR regime, which is
helpful for MU-MIMO secure communications with physical
layer secrecy. In general, the proposed adaptive mode selection
(AMS) scheme determines the optimal transmission mode by
comparing Nt sum secrecy outage capacities, while FIM1 and
FIM2 uses fixed transmission modes regardless of channel
conditions. Thus, AMS has relative higher complexity than
FIM1 and FIM2. However, since mode selection is performed
only when channel conditions change, not within each time
slot, the complexity of AMS is bearable in practical systems.
In addition, Theorem 1 and 2 can be used to determine the
transmission mode at low and high SNR regimes respectively,
which have the same complexity as FIM1 and FIM2.
Next, we investigate the impact of the outage probability
TABLE I
TRANSMISSION MODES FOR DIFFERENT SCHEMES.
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
❳
Scheme
TSNR
-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10
AMS 4 4 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 1 1
FTM1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
FTM2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
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Fig. 4. Performance comparison of AMS scheme with different outage
probabilities.
TABLE III
TRANSMISSION MODES FOR AMS WITH DIFFERENT NUMBERS OF SUS.
P
P
P
P
PP
K
TSNR
-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10
50 4 4 4 4 3 2 2 2 2 2 2
20 4 4 4 4 3 2 2 2 2 2 1
5 4 4 4 3 2 2 2 1 1 1 1
on the sum secrecy outage capacity of the proposed AMS
scheme. The outage probability ε represents the interception
probability with a given secrecy rate. As shown in Fig.4,
when ε = 0.01, namely a quite small interception probability,
the feasible secrecy outage capacity is nearly equal to zero.
As ε increases, the sum secrecy outage capacity improves
accordingly. For example, one with ε = 0.10 has about 0.5
b/s/Hz performance gain over the one with ε = 0.05 at SNR
= 6 dB. Furthermore, the performance gain becomes larger
with the increase of SNR. Note that the sum secrecy outage
capacities with different outage probabilities approaches zero
at low SNR regime, which reconfirms the claims in Proposition
1. From Tab.II, it is seen that as the requirement on the outage
probability relaxes, AMS will be apt to choose a high order
transmission mode, especially at low SNR regime.
Finally, we show the benefit of the proposed AMS scheme
from the perspective of the SU number. As seen in Fig.5, with
the increase of the SU number K , the sum secrecy outage
capacity increases accordingly, since the probability that the
channels of the selected SUs are orthogonal becomes larger. In
other words, the inter-user interference in legitimate channel is
smaller gradually while the one in the eavesdropper channel
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Fig. 5. Performance comparison of AMS scheme with different number of
SUs.
remains unchaged in the statistical sense. In addition, it is
found that the performance gain by increasing K becomes
smaller with a large K . For example, at SNR = 8 dB, the
performance gain by increasing 15 SUs from K = 5 to K =
20 heavily surpasses that by increasing 30 SUs from K = 20
to K = 50. It is because when K is large, the received SNR
based on OSDMA approaches ρ ln(KNtNr) as analyzed in
Section IV.C, so the gain becomes smaller by increasing the
same SUs as K increases. Moreover, the performance gain by
adding SUs is negligible at low SNR, which proves Proposition
1 again. Similarly, from Tab.III, it is also seen that as the
number of SUs increases, AMS will be apt to choose a high
order transmission mode, especially at low SNR regime.
VI. CONCLUSION
The main contribution of this paper is to exploit the benefit
of inter-user interference to improve the sum secrecy outage
capacity in MU-MIMO downlink networks employing phys-
ical layer security. It is found that under different channel
conditions, the inter-user interference plays different roles.
Therefore, we propose an effectively adaptive transmission
mode selection scheme maximizing the sum secrecy outage
capacity. Furthermore, asymptotic analysis is carried out to
further insights on mode selection. For example, our asymptot-
ical results show that at low SNR regime, maximum available
mode should be adopted. Both relaxing the requirement on
the outage probability and increasing the number of SUs are
hardly helpful to improve the secrecy performance. On the
contrary, at high SNR regime, single SU mode is the best
choice and multiple-SU mode will result in zero rate.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
In the noise-limited case, the cdf of λm and the pdf of ηm
are reduced to
Fλm(x) =
(
1− exp
(
−
x
ρ
))K
, (17)
and
fηm(y) =
1
α2ρ
exp
(
−
y
α2ρ
)
, (18)
respectively. Substituting (17) and (18) into (7), the outage
probability in this case can be computed as
ε =
∫ ∞
0
(
1− exp
(
−
2Rm(ε) − 1
ρ
)
exp
(
−
2Rm(ε)
ρ
y
))K
×
exp
(
− yα2ρ
)
α2ρ
dy
= 1 +
K∑
n=1
(
K
n
)
(−1)n
exp
(
−n
(
2Rm(ε) + 1/α2
)
/ρ
)
n2Rm(ε) + 1
.(19)
Interestingly, it is found that the outage probability in (19) is
independent of the transmission mode. Under this condition,
M = Nt can achieve the full multiplexing gain, and also
leads to the maximum sum secrecy outage capacity. Thus, we
complete the proof.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
In the interference-limited case, the cdf of λm and the pdf
of ηm can be expressed as
Fλm(x) =
(
1−
1
(1 + x)M−1
)K
, (20)
and
fηm(y) =
M − 1
(1 + y)M
. (21)
Similarly, the outage capacity is given by
ε =
∫ ∞
0
(
1−
1
2(M−1)Rm(ε)(1 + y)M−1
)K
M − 1
(1 + y)M
dy
= 1 +
K∑
n=1
(
K
n
)(
−2−(M−1)Rm(ε)
)n
n+ 1
=
2(M−1)Rm(ε)
(
1−
(
1− 2−(M−1)Rm(ε)
)K+1)
K + 1
(22)
=
2
M−1
M
R
(
1−
(
1− 2−
M−1
M
R
)K+1)
K + 1
. (23)
where (22) is obtained according to [27, Eqn.0.1553]. From
(23), it is known that ε is a monotonously increasing function
of M−1M and R. Given a requirement on the outage probability
ε, the sum secrecy outage capacity R is maximized by
minimizing M−1M . Clearly,
M−1
M is minimized when M = 1,
which proves the claims in Theorem 2.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
If the user number K is large enough, there is the following
important property that λm → ρ ln(KNt) [34]. In other words,
the legitimate channel capacity approaches a constant log2(1+
ρ ln(KNt)), so the outage probability is transformed as
ε = Pr
(
ηm > 2
log2(1+ρ ln(KNt))−Rm(ε) − 1
)
=
exp
(
− 2
log2(1+ρ ln(KNt))−Rm(ε)−1
α2ρ
)
(
2log2(1+ρ ln(KNt))−Rm(ε)
)M−1 . (24)
As seen in (24), ε is a monotonously increasing function
of Rm(ε) and is a monotonously decreasing function of M .
Given a requirement on the outage capacity ε, secrecy outage
capacity Rm(ε) is maximized with M = Nt, which also
achieves the full multiplexing gain. Thus, we get Theorem
3.
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